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-rw-r--r--src/config.c139
1 files changed, 138 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c
index f31665aa..2cbb6d5b 100644
--- a/src/config.c
+++ b/src/config.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
# include <glob.h>
#endif
#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "libssh/config.h"
#include "libssh/priv.h"
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static struct ssh_config_keyword_table_s ssh_config_keyword_table[] = {
{ "proxyjump", SOC_PROXYJUMP},
{ "proxyusefdpass", SOC_UNSUPPORTED},
{ "pubkeyacceptedtypes", SOC_PUBKEYACCEPTEDTYPES},
- { "rekeylimit", SOC_UNSUPPORTED},
+ { "rekeylimit", SOC_REKEYLIMIT},
{ "remotecommand", SOC_UNSUPPORTED},
{ "revokedhostkeys", SOC_UNSUPPORTED},
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", SOC_UNSUPPORTED},
@@ -604,6 +605,7 @@ ssh_config_parse_line(ssh_session session,
int i, rv;
uint8_t *seen = session->opts.options_seen;
long l;
+ long long ll;
x = s = strdup(line);
if (s == NULL) {
@@ -966,6 +968,141 @@ ssh_config_parse_line(ssh_session session,
ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_KEY_EXCHANGE, p);
}
break;
+ case SOC_REKEYLIMIT:
+ /* Parse the data limit */
+ p = ssh_config_get_str_tok(&s, NULL);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ break;
+ } else if (strcmp(p, "default") == 0) {
+ /* Default rekey limits enforced automaticaly */
+ ll = 0;
+ } else {
+ char *endp = NULL;
+ ll = strtoll(p, &endp, 10);
+ if (p == endp || ll < 0) {
+ /* No number or negative */
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Invalid argument to rekey limit");
+ break;
+ }
+ switch (*endp) {
+ case 'G':
+ if (ll > LLONG_MAX / 1024) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Possible overflow of rekey limit");
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ll = ll * 1024;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case 'M':
+ if (ll > LLONG_MAX / 1024) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Possible overflow of rekey limit");
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ll = ll * 1024;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case 'K':
+ if (ll > LLONG_MAX / 1024) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Possible overflow of rekey limit");
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ll = ll * 1024;
+ endp++;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case '\0':
+ /* just the number */
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Invalid suffix */
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*endp != ' ' && *endp != '\0') {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN,
+ "Invalid trailing characters after the rekey limit: %s",
+ endp);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ll > -1 && *parsing) {
+ uint64_t v = (uint64_t)ll;
+ ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_REKEY_DATA, &v);
+ }
+ /* Parse the time limit */
+ p = ssh_config_get_str_tok(&s, NULL);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ break;
+ } else if (strcmp(p, "none") == 0) {
+ ll = 0;
+ } else {
+ char *endp = NULL;
+ ll = strtoll(p, &endp, 10);
+ if (p == endp || ll < 0) {
+ /* No number or negative */
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Invalid argument to rekey limit");
+ break;
+ }
+ switch (*endp) {
+ case 'w':
+ case 'W':
+ if (ll > LLONG_MAX / 7) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Possible overflow of rekey limit");
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ll = ll * 7;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case 'd':
+ case 'D':
+ if (ll > LLONG_MAX / 24) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Possible overflow of rekey limit");
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ll = ll * 24;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case 'h':
+ case 'H':
+ if (ll > LLONG_MAX / 60) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Possible overflow of rekey limit");
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ll = ll * 60;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case 'm':
+ case 'M':
+ if (ll > LLONG_MAX / 60) {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Possible overflow of rekey limit");
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ll = ll * 60;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case 's':
+ case 'S':
+ endp++;
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ case '\0':
+ /* just the number */
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Invalid suffix */
+ ll = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*endp != '\0') {
+ SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARN, "Invalid trailing characters after the"
+ " rekey limit: %s", endp);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ll > -1 && *parsing) {
+ uint32_t v = (uint32_t)ll;
+ ssh_options_set(session, SSH_OPTIONS_REKEY_TIME, &v);
+ }
+ break;
case SOC_GSSAPIAUTHENTICATION:
case SOC_KBDINTERACTIVEAUTHENTICATION:
case SOC_PASSWORDAUTHENTICATION: