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authorAlan Dunn <amdunn@gmail.com>2014-02-06 08:12:46 -0600
committerAndreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>2014-02-06 19:41:00 +0100
commitbb0023b7c703a932b59756b728c95ca7e28e58c4 (patch)
tree0bb52537ce4096ff42f743a9564744691660b43f /src/packet1.c
parent398e8d50b54c6947b9c6e494fc6adc17e96521be (diff)
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packet: Do not decrypt zero length rest of buffer
If we receive a packet of length exactly blocksize, then packet_decrypt gets called on a buffer of size 0. The check at the beginning of packet_decrypt indicates that the function should be called on buffers of at least one blocksize, though the check allows through zero length. As is packet_decrypt can return -1 when len is 0 because malloc can return NULL in this case: according to the ISO C standard, malloc is free to return NULL or a pointer that can be freed when size == 0, and uclibc by default will return NULL here (in "non-glibc-compatible" mode). The net result is that when using uclibc connections with libssh can anomalously fail. Alternatively, packet_decrypt (and probably packet_encrypt for consistency) could be made to always succeed on len == 0 without depending on the behavior of malloc. Thanks to Josh Berlin for bringing conneciton failures with uclibc to my attention. Signed-off-by: Alan Dunn <amdunn@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/packet1.c')
-rw-r--r--src/packet1.c19
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/src/packet1.c b/src/packet1.c
index ec72f166..3284f17a 100644
--- a/src/packet1.c
+++ b/src/packet1.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback1(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user
size_t processed=0;
uint32_t padding;
uint32_t crc;
- uint32_t len;
+ uint32_t len, buffer_len;
ssh_session session=(ssh_session)user;
switch (session->packet_state){
@@ -168,11 +168,16 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback1(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user
* We decrypt everything, missing the lenght part (which was
* previously read, unencrypted, and is not part of the buffer
*/
- if (packet_decrypt(session,
- ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->in_buffer),
- ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer)) < 0) {
- ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Packet decrypt error");
- goto error;
+ buffer_len = ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer);
+ if (buffer_len > 0) {
+ int rc;
+ rc = packet_decrypt(session,
+ ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->in_buffer),
+ buffer_len);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Packet decrypt error");
+ goto error;
+ }
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CRYPTO
@@ -300,6 +305,8 @@ int packet_send1(ssh_session session) {
ssh_buffer_get_len(session->out_buffer));
#endif
+ /* session->out_buffer should have more than sizeof(uint32_t) bytes
+ in it as required for packet_encrypt */
packet_encrypt(session, (unsigned char *)ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->out_buffer) + sizeof(uint32_t),
ssh_buffer_get_len(session->out_buffer) - sizeof(uint32_t));